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DIRECTORATE OF  
INTELLIGENCE

# MEMORANDUM

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Information as of 1600  
20 April 1967

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#### HIGHLIGHTS

Extensive bomb damage was inflicted on two electric power plants in Haiphong on 20 April, according to a preliminary assessment of post-strike photography. If this assessment proves correct, Haiphong is without its power supply and the national power net has suffered a major loss.

I. The Military Situation in South Vietnam:  
Operation PRAIRIE began its fourth phase in northern most Quang Tri Province (Paras. 1-2). A North Vietnamese [ ] rallied has provided information on enemy losses in 1966 and future plans of major units in the cen-

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
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V. Communist Political Developments:

The Liberation Front representative in Hanoi is building up his own role in the diplomatic community (Paras. 3-4).

VI. Other Major Aspects: Foreign visitors to North Vietnam report up to two thirds of the early rice crop lost because of a "poor monsoon season," but hard evidence does not support these claims (Paras. 1-2).

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# I. THE MILITARY SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM

1. PRAIRIE III, a month-long US Marine search-and-destroy operation immediately south of the Demilitarized Zone, ended on 19 April. The four USMC battalions in this operation accounted for 252 Communists killed and 164 persons detained. A total of 55 marines were killed and 529 were wounded.

2. The PRAIRIE series of operations has continued in this area since last summer when the North Vietnamese first began moving large regular units into and south of the DMZ. PRAIRIE IV is now under way in the same area, involving the same US units.

## Rallier Reveals Future Communist Strategy

3. A North Vietnamese [redacted] who rallied [redacted] has recently provided information on Communist plans in the central coastal provinces and some of the problems they

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6. He related plans for a major campaign in which [ ] would drive northward with the objective of linking up with the 324B NVA Division--which would attack southward from Quang Tri Province--at Hue. This ambitious strategy is similar to plans mentioned in captured documents and interrogation reports. The enemy has the capability to begin such a large-scale offensive, but there is no evidence that the Communists are planning a maneuver of such magnitude at this time.

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
## II. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTH VIETNAM

1. In early April, members of Premier Ky's personal staff extracted pledges of support for Ky's presidential bid from I Corps commander General Hoang Xuan Lam, and from leaders of certain factions of the VNQDD (Nationalist) party in I Corps, [redacted] Lam's preference for either Ky or Chief of State Thieu has generally been in question, as have the preferences of the commanders of II and IV Corps. It is not yet fully clear how any of these generals, or several others whose personal loyalties appear to waiver, would decide if a showdown were to develop within the top echelon of the military over their candidate for the presidency.

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2. Ky's solicitation of support from the VNQDD has been going on for nearly two months and is reportedly bearing fruit. Public loyalties in I Corps are generally split between the VNQDD, the Revolu-

## Hanoi-Haiphong Area Electric Power Grid



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
### III. MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS IN NORTH VIETNAM

1. The tempo of US air operations over North Vietnam increased for the second consecutive day as US Navy and Air Force aircraft struck three thermal power plants, an ammunition depot, and an infiltration training center on 20 April. Preliminary reports indicate extensive damage and no US plane losses or MIG encounters.

2. Initial poststrike photography indicates that two of the power plants, located on the eastern and western outskirts of Haiphong, received severe damage as a result of a two-phase attack executed by 52 US Navy planes. If this analysis is correct, the city of Haiphong would be totally without its normal sources of electric power. In addition, only one of seven stations in the Hanoi-Haiphong power net would be left operating.

3. Destruction of major power plants had already significantly reduced the amount of electric power available to Hanoi and Haiphong. Photography  reveals that the electric generating plants at Thai Nguyen, Viet Tri, and Hon Gay have been rendered inoperative by cumulative bomb damage. In addition, the power plant at Bac Giang may also have been heavily damaged by air strikes during March.

4. These four plants are believed to supply Hanoi with about half of its electric power and Haiphong with about one third. Output from the four plants also supplies more than half the power fed into the Hanoi-Haiphong grid. The loss of output from the four plants has probably eliminated nonessential use of electric power in Hanoi and Haiphong as well as restricted power available for essential use. It is believed that only a small part of the power loss can be offset by diesel-driven generating equipment. There is no confirmation to date, however, that usage of electric power in Hanoi or Haiphong has been restricted.



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5. Also on 20 April, US Air Force F-105s bombed the Bac Giang ammunition depot 26 miles northeast of Hanoi. Poststrike photography is not yet available, but pilot reports suggest extensive damage. Thirty-four USAF aircraft also carried out attacks on the Xuan Mai insurgency training center for the second day in a row. Bomb damage assessment photographs of the earlier attack reveal that extensive damage has been done to the target.

6. Subsequent information on the major air battle which occurred over Xuan Mai on 19 April indicates that at least one and possibly three MIG-17s were downed by US fighters and that six others were probably damaged. Returning US pilots commented that the Communist fighters were extremely aggressive and made no mistakes in their air tactics.

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IV. OTHER COMMUNIST MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS

1. There is nothing of significance to report.

V. COMMUNIST POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

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Activities of Front Representative in Hanoi

3.

[redacted] Nguyen Van Tinh, head of the Liberation Front representation in the DRV, is informing the Hanoi diplomatic corps that the NFLSV, and not the DRV, is the "organization" with which they should now deal in matters concerning South Vietnam.

4. If accurately reported, the Front representative may be attempting to underscore the NFLSV's claim to be independent of Hanoi and reinforce its statement that it is the "sole genuine representative

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of the South Vietnamese people." The Hanoi diplomatic community is frequently quoted as believing that the Front is independent of Hanoi, and Tien may be attempting to strengthen this belief. He could also be trying to enhance his own personal position in the community.



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## VI. OTHER MAJOR ASPECTS

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1. [redacted] are reporting that up to two thirds of the early rice crop may be lost because of a "poor monsoon season." Sowing of this crop was completed in February, and harvesting is due in May and June. A normal crop amounts to about 1.5 million tons--a third of the annual rice harvest.

2. The evidence does not indicate that the reports are correct. September to April are the months of lowest rainfall each year in the main agricultural regions of North Vietnam, and the monsoon does not begin until about April. The land was not drought stricken when the rice crop was sowed. Accumulated weather data show precipitation to have been about average through January. Additional weather information is lacking but if rains since then have been below average--one inch, for example, instead of two--there may have been some effect on the early rice crop, but not of a magnitude approaching a two-thirds loss. It is actually too early to predict the size of the crop, since it is dependent on normal rainfall in April and May.

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